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Mouillee; (2) whether the Corps required a new indemnification
agreement for the project; and (3) whether immediate action was
required.
On the first issue, the Corps argued the deposition of Conner
Creek sediment was a new use of Pointe Mouillee because it
constituted environmental dredging, while the Corps used Pointe
Mouillee for navigational dredging. Since the original project did not
contemplate environmental dredging, the Corps argued that EPA
must complete a new Environmental Assessment ("EA") for Pointe
Mouillee. The court stated that the River and Harbor Act of 1970
("Act") and the 1974 agreement creating Point Mouillee governed its
use. The court concluded neither the Act's language nor the 1974
agreement precluded Pointe Mouillee's use for non-navigational
dredging. Accordingly, the court found disposal of Conner Creek
material did not constitute a new use of Point Mouillee.
The second issue addressed whether the project required a new
indemnification agreement. The Corps argued Michigan must sign a
new indemnification agreement before the Corps could accept the
material. The original agreement contained a "hold harmless" clause,
which protected the federal government from damages caused by
construction, operation, and facility maintenance. The court ruled
the "hold harmless" clause sufficiently protected the United States
government from any liability connected with the site's operation, and
no further assurances were necessary.
The third issue was whether the Corps must act immediately. The
Corps argued no need existed for immediate action since dredging
was not scheduled to begin until 2002. DWSD argued it must have the
issue concerning the disposal site finalized by November 22, 2000, in
order to qualify for the State Revolving Fund. DWSD argued that, in
the absence of this funding, its ratepayers would incur an additional
$40,000,000 in additional interest charges. For this reason, DWSD
asserted the Corps must act immediately. The court agreed and ruled
the monetary deadline required immediate action.
The court ruled in favor of DWSD and MDEQ on all issues and
ordered the Corps to act immediately and accept Conner Creek
dredged material.
Brian L. Martin
Madison v. Graham, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. Mont. 2001) (holding:
(1) Madison's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim
was improperly raised and failed under substantive due process review;
(2) Madison failed to show the Montana Stream Access statute was
irrational and arbitrary and had no conceivable public purpose
relating to public welfare; and (3) both statute of limitations and res
judicata violations ultimately barred all of Madison's claims).
Harvey and Doris Madison, among others, (collectively "Madison")

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 4

brought this claim in federal district court to enjoin permanently
Defendants, Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks, among
others, (collectively "FWP") from enforcing the Montana Stream
Access Law. The Montana Stream Access Law allows public use of all
surface waters capable of recreational use up to the high-water mark of
privately owned streambeds, regardless of ownership of the underlying
land. The law allowed for public use of the Stillwater and Ruby Rivers
and O'Dell Creek-waters adjacent to Madison's land. Madison
challenged the law, asserting it violated his substantive due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and, alternatively, under
federal law. Madison's second claim asserted the statute violated his
due process rights because it was void for vagueness, and, therefore,
illegal. FWP filed eight motions to dismiss challenging Madison's
claims.
The United States District Court for the District of Montana
analyzed the Montana Stream Access Law pursuant to the Montana
Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and relevant case law. The
court cited Montana Supreme Court precedent that affirmed the
public's right to use state-owned water for recreation as a narrowly
confined public easement over the bed and banks of privately owned
streams. The court also cited Montana Supreme Court precedent to
affirm the constitutionality of the statute. The court then analyzed
FWP's eight motions to dismiss and sustained each one.
The first motion to dismiss concerned whether the Taking Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, and not the Fourteenth Amendment as
argued by Madison, was the basis of Madison's complaint. The court
agreed with FWP that the complaint was founded in the Taking Clause
and cited Ninth Circuit authority to apply the Taking Clause test
instead.
FWP's second motion to dismiss concerned whether, under the
Taking Clause test, the stream access laws were rationally related to a
legitimate state interest and were, therefore, a valid exercise of police
power. The court distinguished two taking cases raised by Madison.
The court stated the cases Madison raised involved the taking of
private property rights and not an interest in publicly owned surface
waters that cross a streambed. The court concluded Madison failed to
meet the Taking Clause criteria and failed to state properly such a
claim.
FWP's third motion to dismiss asserted Madison failed to show the
absence of public purpose within the Stream Access Law as required
under a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.
Under this test, Madison had to prove both that the legislature had no
rational reason to enact the law and no intent to advance a public
purpose. The court determined Madison had failed to show the
statute had no public purpose. The court found FWP raised several
rational reasons to support the law.
FWP's fourth motion to dismiss concerned (1) whether the
Montana Stream Access Law's failure either to permit or to proscribe
portage around natural barriers violated the vagueness doctrine; and
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(2) whether the law's definition of "high-water mark" was vague. First,
the court stated Madison's claim intended to challenge the
legislature's failure to enact a law, not to challenge vagueness. Second,
the court held Madison failed to show the definition of high-water
mark was so vague that men of common intelligence had to guess at its
meaning. Accordingly, the court affirmed FWP's fourth motion to
dismiss.
FWP's fifth motion to dismiss concerned whether the claim
violated the statute of limitations. The court found Madison missed
the three-year general tort statute of limitations deadline by
approximately twelve years. The court rejected Madison's claim that a
Thus, the statute of
continuing violation exception applied.
limitations barred Madison's claim.
FWP's sixth motion to dismiss asserted res judicata barred
Madison's claims. Because one of the Madison's co-parties was
previously involved in a suit challenging the same law under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the court decided res judicata barred
Madison from raising the same claim on the same grounds.
FWP's motion to dismiss argued the Full Faith and Credit Clause
required that the court honor a previous adjudication of the
constitutionality of Montana's Stream Access Law, therefore, barring
Madison's claims. The court found that two of the Madison co-parties
received virtual representation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause
through participation in an earlier adjudication. Thus, the court held
resjudicata barred Madison's claim based on the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.
FWP's final motion to dismiss concerned whether the RookerFeldman Doctrine ("Doctrine") barred federal district court review of
Montana Supreme Court cases. Under the Doctrine, a federal district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review final state supreme
court decisions or constitutional claims intertwined with state court
decisions. The court held the Doctrine barred Madison from seeking
federal appellate review in this federal district court and granted the
motion to dismiss.
The court sustained all of FWP's motions to dismiss and dismissed
Madison's complaint with prejudice.
ChristineEllison
D'Agnillo v. U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., No. 89 Civ. 5609
(CSH), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17290 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2000)
(holding alleged deficiencies in the City of Yonkers' environmental
assessments for a housing development were not sufficient to: (1)
grant an injunction to withhold United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development funds for the development; (2) grant an
injunction to stop construction by the City of Yonkers; (3) declare the
environmental assessments invalid; or (4) declare the City of Yonkers
must conduct another area-wide environmental assessment).

